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Article 14

Community Cooperation and
Development
Robert C. Anderson
ABSTRACT
The paper describes a phenomenological approach to the understanding and explanation of how people and organizations make the decision to become involved in community
action. Three sufficient conditions to induce cooperation are presented. Community
action is presented as the result of a cooperative system of people and organizations that
choose to become involved independently, based on their absolute and dynamic values.
A model for community involvement is described that includes a problem, the social
structure, convergence of interest, and goal formation. Formation of effective initiating,
recruitment, and execution sets is presented as an important consideration for all
community action.

This article is an essay on community-wide efforts at change as seen by the
author in more than 30 years of direct experience in the business of community
development education. It is written to present core ideas designed to give a
clearer understanding of the communities in which we live. We know, to begin
with, that each community has a history of successful and not-so-successful
"community development" efforts. As a result of these efforts, over time the
relationships among people and between their systems tend to become fragmented and highly polarized. Positions are taken; sides are drawn as problems
arise and are resolved. Conflicting relationships tend to develop among social
systems and the people in these systems when their attention is turned to community development problems. The solutions of these problems generally call
for significant commitment and cooperation on the part of units (social systems)
and people directly affected by the problem.
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A Phenomenological Start
A starting point from which to study the process is to keep in mind that the
community, our community, is what we think it is, what we believe it to be or not
to be. If we view our community as good, then that is the way we are going to keep
it. If we view it as bad, then we are either going to try to alter it or leave it. How
we view our community is related to our belief system. It is phenomenological. It
has something to do with perceptions, identity, loyalty, and structure. (Boulding,
1961)
The proposition is made that the community—in terms of its people, social
systems, and structure—is a cooperative system, not because cooperation is a "good
thing," but because it is absolutely necessary in order to achieve community goals
(Kanter, 1983; Kelman and Warwick, 1973; Loomis, 1960; Louman and Pappi,
1976; Parsons, 1937, 1960; Weber, 1943).
Despite an almost universal impression of national selfishness and narcissism,
Americans are basically cooperative. In fact, there is a widely held cultural belief
that it is good to be cooperative and bad to be noncooperative. As a society we tend
to shy away from or avoid noncooperative people. But Americans are also pragmatic and discriminate carefully in their patterns of cooperation or involvement.
So the basic question is, "Why—that is, in what circumstances and under what
conditions—do we cooperate or not cooperate?"
From my scholarship, research, and observation of human behavior, I have
worked out this explanation. The general philosophical principle is: / will not
cooperate with anybody, for any reason, on any task that I can do myself (Anderson,
1963; 1970; 1976; 1986).
I believe that this individualistic, self-centered do-it-myself position characterizes the American people more accurately than participatory democracy, cooperation, altruism, or concern for the well-being of others. When I say this, I
am not making a value judgment. I am simply saying analytically that if there is
any one principle that seems to govern the behavior of most people, it is the
principle that they do not cooperate with anybody on any task they can do
themselves.
We all deal with, and are responsible for, very limited resources, the resources of our own time, talent, money, and values. Therefore, it is logical that we
ask, "Why should I cooperate?" before making a cooperative commitment.
Clearly, we cannot always remain independent because we haven't the
resources to do everything alone. We organize and cooperate to achieve tasks
that we perceive are worth doing and that we cannot achieve by ourselves. If
any one of us could do these tasks individually we probably would, because
then the benefits derived from them would be ours—social recognition,
monetary reward, self-satisfaction, or whatever—benefits based on values of
importance to us. If I cooperate with somebody on a task, then it is no longer

COMMUNITY COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

135

my project, it is our project. I must share the gains or losses associated with it
with somebody else.
Once we identify a project worth doing and assess what is needed to get the
job done, the relevant principle of involvement is that the only time we should seek
the involvement of someone else is when he or she has a resource that, combined
with our resource, will accomplish the task that could not be independently
achieved. Then we tend to share or exchange our loosely held or surplus resources,
but not our closely held values.
All acts of involvement have a price tag, a cost, an investment, a responsibility. This cost is reflected in terms of the allocation of our own limited
resources and our identification with the resulting product. So when we set up
cooperative arrangements, these are not to be entered into lightly. None of us
can afford to be so cooperative as to say, "Sure, count me in," every time we are
asked to become involved in an activity. That may be why there appears to be
some public apathy in most communities. It may well be that many of our
community projects are really not worth the cost of commitment called for or
necessary to complete the project. Maybe the costs, or the potential losses, are
too high. Or it simply may be a project of little or no importance to us at that
time. In other words, cooperation may be good and rewarding, not so good and
not rewarding, or irrelevant and unnecessary. In fact, it may be harmful (Etzioni,
1975; Kimberly et al., 1980; March, 1965; March and Simon, 1959; Merton,
1959).
We do not really involve ourselves in any meaningful decision making,
development, or cooperative act without committing ourselves and our resources to that action. To simply say, "It is a good idea," or "I wish you luck," or
"Let me know how it turns out," is not meaningful interaction. It is not sufficient cooperation and does not generally lead to development. Only when we
are willing to invest ourselves and our resources are we likely to become a part
of community decision making and community development. When we do this,
we place our life's values on the line and they cannot be retracted. That is what
it takes to get into the decision-making structures of communities and to become a community decision maker for community development. Our personal and
organizational resources—name, reputation, what we stand for—are involved.
The Cooperative Process
Community involvement is a very obvious part of community development.
Community involvement, by definition, calls for community cooperation, but
what is "cooperation?" (Barnard, 1938). Cooperation is a very widely used and
generally misunderstood concept in most communities of America. It is appropriate, at this point, to state my ideas about community cooperation in a
more precise form:
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1. Cooperation is not good or bad; it may be either or both.
2. Community action is organizational in character, whether it is the informal
organization of two people or large-scale formal organizations of 500
people. Community action is an organizational activity and, as such, some
common "principles of organization" govern the action.
3. Community actions are interorganizational and therefore cooperative
activities. This is true not because of choice or because of the goodness
or appropriateness of cooperation, but because of a necessity for multiperson/multiunit involvement and commitment for successful community
problem resolution.
4. Cooperation is the ordinary business of life in a human society.
5. Cooperation comes into being when: (1) there are persons or organizations
able to communicate with each other (2) who are willing to contribute
their own limited resources to a cooperative action (3) to accomplish a
specific goal.
6. Cooperation occurs only when individual or organizational limitations
become significant factors in goal achievement and when the application
of the resource energy of two or more persons or organizations has the
potential to overcome this limitation.
People must be induced to cooperation or there can be no cooperation. The
net satisfactions that induce people to contribute their efforts to an organization
result from their perception of positive advantages as against the disadvantages
that are entailed.
Sufficient conditions for involvement in cooperative community action
programs involve at least three elements or postulates:
Postulate 1 :
An individual or organization will become involved in, and contribute
resources to, cooperative activities that will directly enhance the interest of that
specific individual or organization.
Postulate 2:
An individual or organization will become involved in, and contribute
resources to, cooperative activities that will directly enhance the interest of a
broader community of interests of which that specific individual or organization
is a member or part.
When these two conditions are met, it is possible to postulate that:
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Postulate 3:
An individual or organization will insist on becoming involved in and contributing resources to cooperative activities that are perceived as serving the actual
or potential good of the whole community of interest as well as of each individual
or organization holding membership in that community.
The Involvement Process
Given this image of the cooperative process, I now want to describe briefly a
model for community involvement. To do so, I have drawn heavily on the work of
a number of sociologists at Michigan State University. I believe their work provides
a base for understanding community involvement as it really is (Sower et al., 1957;
Miller, 1953).
There are three major parts to the model:
1. Problem recognition, convergence of interest, and goal formation
(1) Identification of a problem
(2) Identification of the individual units and groups directly affected,
positively as well as negatively
(3) Development of alternative solutions
2. Establishment of an initiating set
(1) Justifying the membership of the initiating set
(2) Justifying the goals proposed by the initiating set
(3) Securing legitimation, support, and sponsorship of these goals
3. Recruitment and establishment of an execution set
(1) Justifying the membership of the execution set
(2) Securing organizational as well as individual commitment to a
program of action
(3) Planning the detailed course of action to follow
(4) Implementing or carrying out the action program
Briefly let us follow the path through this model for community involvement
(Figure 1) and see if it has any relevance to the understanding of community action
programs. I believe it does account for and explain essential aspects of most
community action projects. Note that all of the "action" in this model takes place
before the implementation of the community action. (Figure 1, Model for Community Involvement, is derived and adapted from Model for Community Action
in Sower etal., 1957:317.)
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Figure 1 -Model for Community Involvement
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Let us assume a community problem has been recognized and alternative
courses of action have been contemplated. Starting at the top of the model, our
first task is to identify the specific social units (the social structures) that in one
way or another are directly affected by the community action to be taken. Make
a list of all individuals, groups or organizations that have a socially defined right
to become involved in the action. At this point it is not important how or if they
will get involved or what position (for or against) they are likely to take. The
only test to be met is: do they have the socially defined right to be involved in
the action?
If so, they make up the legitimate order affected by that particular problem.
The legitimate order is defined as including all individuals or groups who see
themselves and are seen by others as having the socially defined right to be
involved in the action. One test of such membership is whether the unit in
question will go into opposition if it is ignored, not consulted, or not involved.
Next we need to consider the basis for securing cooperation of members of
the legitimate order for the community action proposed. Support for such action
must logically evolve from value bases appropriate to each unit in the legitimate
order of the social structure within which it is being proposed. By this I mean
that each organization in the legitimate order will independently test—approve or
reject—the proposed action using its own organizational values as involvement
criteria.
The value bases for cooperative involvement of these units are derived from two
sources. The first I call the absolute value base, such as "symbols and sentiment;" the second may be referred to as the dynamic value base, such as
"appraisal and allocative standards."
Symbols and sentiments are considered to be absolute in character. They
are the time-tested, traditional, generally unchallengeable foundations of an
individual's or an organization's behavior. They are belief systems. Every individual and every organization has a belief system, an absolute value base that
is not challengeable. To debate it is nonsense. If, for example, I am bigoted and
a racist, you are not going to change my mind or my heart with logical reasoning and arguments that assert that I shouldn't be. You may be able to do it with
some other kinds of strategy, but probably not with rational debate or systematic
evidence. This value base may govern whether and how I do or do not become
involved in cooperative activity.
Dynamic values, or appraisal and allocative standards, on the other hand,
are rationally derived, tentative in nature, and subject to periodic evaluation and
change. They are best illustrated by our use of new knowledge. As technology
develops, we drop old technologies and old ways of doing things and adopt new
ways, employing the new technology. Such value changes are ever-present and
occur in all facets of life. We see evidence of this in the market place, in the
food we eat and the fashions we wear. We see it in modes of travel, in offices
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and industry. We even see changes in education, religion, and community
affairs.
After the assessment of value bases likely to govern the behavior of the
social structure to be involved, the next step in the model is the convergence of
interest. This takes on a special meaning here in that it implies a convergence
upon the acceptance of a specific group goal. Different individual organizations
can accept the same goal for quite different reasons. The important point is that
convergence does take place regardless of the individual or independent motive
backing this social convergence. When social convergence takes place, then,
and only then, does meaningful goal formation occur.
In many community development efforts, however, the tendency is to deal
with the people who have the same values we have, those who have to contribute essentially the same resources that we possess. We hesitate to talk to
those who have a different set of values; we find it uncomfortable and difficult
to associate with them. We have difficulty understanding their positions. In
essence, we tend to talk to ourselves, never really recognizing that there are
other views in the world. If we really want to solve community problems, we
must involve people with different viewpoints; and on their terms, not ours.
In so doing, we will modify our goal a little bit to accommodate their
vested interests. To the extent that points of common interest can be enhanced
or solved by a community action proposal, we can expect to secure a positive
commitment of cooperation from the relevant units. If, on the other hand, we
push for action and such a move is perceived as detrimental or upsetting to
these vested interests, we would predict that organized opposition to the plan
would be forthcoming. It also is entirely possible to propose a project that
affects relevant units but, in their view of the situation, the potential impact
seems inconsequential so they are indifferent to the project and take no action.
The decision to cooperate or not cooperate made by each unit involved is
determined by some combination of absolute values and dynamic values. There
is not much room to argue or debate the first. It is generally not advisable to
tamper with symbols and sentiments or belief systems. If our proposal fits, it
will generate support. If not, we cannot do much to change the situation. Isolation of such units in the legitimate order may be called for. The use of reason or
debate, when the proposal is counter to the organization's symbols and sentiments, could well result in the generation of dedicated opposition rather than
cooperation. On the other hand, appraisal and allocative standards or dynamic
values can be changed with the proper presentation of sound rational and factual
information.
When we attempt to induce an organization to cooperate in community
action programs, the main points to remember are:
1. Select symbols and sentiments common to each organization for use in the
appeal for cooperation.
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2. Select symbols and sentiments independently held that are not in conflict
with other organizations' interests.
3. Do not directly alter or attempt to change organizational symbols and
sentiments that run counter to the proposed plan of action. Try to avoid
them; it is generally better to "go it alone" than stir up dedicated
opposition.
4. Select common appraisal and allocation standards when possible.
5. Aggressively counter conflicting appraisal and allocation standards with
hard factual evidence and you will establish a new base for cooperative
efforts.
I want to underscore again the point that the decision to become involved,
to cooperate, is made by each unit of the legitimate order on its own value
terms, not ours. After we have accounted for vested interests, then we can move
to the next step, the establishment of an initiating set. This is a group of individuals or organizations who are held in high enough regard to have the social
right to initiate a plan of action. They also must be able to legitimize the plan
and secure the obligation of others in the sponsorship of action. The right of an
individual or an organization to initiate, to introduce something in a community,
has to be earned. It is not granted automatically. Here is where many community development efforts run into program difficulties. What kinds of activities does that group have the right to initiate with the community? What
activities are strictly not their right to become involved in? For example, presidents of universities have the right to raise money for teaching and research, but
they are not the right people to initiate changes in the curriculum. That is a
faculty responsibility. Preplanning the correct strategy to use is essential at this
stage of the process.
The initiating set also has to justify its goal in terms of value bases. As
mentioned above, findings on community action show clearly that different individuals and organizations justify group goals for quite different or even opposing
reasons. The important test is not how each group justifies the goal, but whether or
not it does, and whether it then decides to join in the sponsorship of the action.
An important function of the initiating set in the involvement process is to
conduct negotiations to determine how to alter and redefine the goal so as to
involve the critical proportion of the legitimate order that can justify, legitimize,
and, hence, sponsor and support the proposed action.
Moving to the lefthand block of the model, we see that individuals will
either offer good will, support, be indifferent to, or oppose the proposed action.
Likewise, we see on the righthand block of the model that organizations have
the same alternatives. How access to different individuals or organizations in the
legitimate order is to be gained—i.e., whether by overlapping or multimembership in different organizations, personal channels, justification based on logical
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reasoning, or by some other kind of general appeal—must be determined and
carried out by the initiating set at this stage of the involvement process.
To begin with, they need to account for major organized interests that
potentially have something at stake in such a goal effort. These may be classified into at least three groups: approving, indifferent, and opposed. The point
here is to actually identify and specifically account for the kind of involvement
that can be expected from the individual and organized interests directly
affected by the action proposal.
Early strategy to follow would be the neutralization or containment of
potential opposition and the moving of indifferent individuals and organizations
into a position of supportive involvement in goal formation and program sponsorship. This can be accomplished by carefully justifying the proposed plan
using the independent value bases governing the behavior of each individual or
organization. It may be that one of the best sources of assistance in goal formation, sponsorship, and execution leadership can be obtained from what are initially indifferent individuals and organizations. If the opposition is not contained
or neutralized at this point in the process, common sense would say the plan
should be brought to a halt and a reappraisal made.
Community action programs traditionally are perceived as being carried out
by community leaders, community-minded individuals. I would argue, however,
that most action programs call for commitments of resources far beyond those
held by individuals. If we are trying to achieve anything that has an impact, not
only do we have personal commitments of individuals, but we also have to
secure corporate or organizational commitment, large and small, public and
private, and vertical as well as horizontal. Many projects call for commitment of
the scarce resources of the city, churches, utilities, associations, industrial and business firms, schools, colleges, and universities. Unless we obtain such commitment, we are not likely to activate a meaningful program. Rather, we will
probably engage in a lot of talk, have a lot of dialogue, but have no action
program.
It is individuals who in the end must represent their organization and commit its resources for or against the proposed action. It should not be too difficult
to identify the individuals who, as responsible organizational representatives,
can justify and sponsor an action program within their own organization. They
must not only be personally committed, but must be able to justify the program
to their representative organization and secure an organizational commitment of
support.
After the decision is made to carry out or execute the action, it is important
to obtain the necessary facilities for carrying it out. This is accomplished through
what can be called the recruitment process. This is the point at which firm commitments for cooperative action are made, and execution set is formed and carries
out the details of the action plan.

COMMUNITY COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

143

Winding It Up
As we attempt to mobilize resources for our program, I would like to suggest
that we secure only the resources sufficient to get the job done. I question the
advisability of always attempting to maximize involvement. I do so on several
grounds:
1. We are always dealing with limited resources of people's time, talent, and
economic possessions. We must be discriminating in our allocation of
these resources.
2. There are many good alternative community development projects that
call for citizen and corporate or organizational involvement. To expect
extensive, continuous commitment of people for all "good causes" is to
expect the impossible.
3. For some projects, widespread involvement may, in fact, prevent rather
than facilitate community goal achievement. When the task becomes
everybody's responsibility, in all too many cases it becomes nobody's
responsibility.
4. There is a social cost associated with involvement. You can go to the social
bank and withdraw people's commitment and involvement only for a
limited period without making some new deposits.
Finally, I wish to restate the basic questions which must be answered if you
are to secure cooperative involvement of people and their organizations in community development programs:
What specific tasks are you attempting to achieve?
•

What kind of involvement is really necessary to get the job done?

•

What contribution will each involved person or organization be
expected to make and can they afford to make such a contribution?

•

What is in it for them?

•

What is in it for you?

•

What is in it for your community?
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